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Abstract:
This paper analyzes the effects of an unanticipated increase in immigration in a macroe-
conomic model with search and matching frictions. It shows how an immigration shock
can lead to a temporary increase in unemployment under a variety of conditions and that
this is qualitatively consistent with the responses from a VAR estimated on post-war US
data.
Keywords : Macroeconomics, Immigration, Unemployment
3
1 Introduction
What are the effects on the macroeconomy of an unanticipated increase in immigration?
This is an important theoretical consideration and, given the current events in Europe,
is of practical interest as well. Immigration has been a significant part of US population
growth over recent decades. In 1970 about 9.6 million (4.7%) of the US total population
was foreign born to non-US nationals. In 2010 this number had risen to nearly 40
million or 12.9% of the US total population according to US Census Bureau and Current
Population Survey (CPS) data. In this paper we take a macroeconomic perspective and
examine the effect of shocks to the working population on the macroeconomy using a
dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) framework with labor market frictions.
This paper shows in this context under a variety of conditions, that an increase in the
working population can lead to a temporary increase in unemployment and that this is
qualitatively consistent with the responses from a VAR estimated on post-war US data.
There is now a sizable literature analyzing the dynamic macroeconomic effects of
immigration on the economy. Early examples of papers using the neoclassical growth
model include Canova and Ravn (2000) who analyze the macroeconomic impact of re-
gional migration from Eastern to Western Germany1, Hazari and Sgro (2003) and Moy
and Yip (2006) who focus on illegal or undocumented migration, and Palivos (2009) and
Palivos and Yip (2010) who contrast the effects of migration on skilled and unskilled
labor. Ben-Gad (2004, 2008) also develops a neoclassical growth model with overlapping
dynasties to explore welfare consequences of legal immigration. More recently papers
have incorporated labor markets with search and matching frictions into the analysis
in order to investigate the impacts of migration on unemployment, see for example Liu
(2010), Battisti et al. (2014), and Chassamboulli and Peri (2015).
The analysis closest to ours is the work of Chassamboulli and Palivos (2013, 2014),
which finds that the job-creating response of firms to immigration leads to positive em-
ployment effects on natives. This is in line with the results in this paper. However, we
also find that immigration causes a temporal increase in unemployment, while Chassam-
boulli and Palivos (2013, 2014) find the opposite effect. The source of this difference
lies in the presence of a participation margin in our model so that, as we show below,
immigration leads households to increase their labor supply in the transition to the new
1For recent macroeconomic analysis of regional migration, see Hauser (2014)’s analysis of US inter-
state migration.
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steady state. This causes non-participants to enter the pool of job seekers resulting in a
temporary rise in unemployment.
Specifically, this paper adapts the model of Bru¨ckner and Pappa (2012) (the BP
model, hereafter), to allow for immigration shocks. The model is a Diamond-Mortensen-
Pissarides model of search frictions (Diamond, 1982; Mortensen and Pissarides, 1994)
in a macroeconomic labor market. There are heterogeneous workers who each face a
labor force participation decision. Different worker types have different job matching
probabilities and so different job finding rates. This heterogeneity allows us to analyze
different scenarios about migrants’ position in the labor market. Our baseline scenario
assumes that migrants enter the labor market as unemployed workers with a low job
matching probability. However we also examine scenarios where immigrants enter with
a job and where they have a high job matching probability. In each case unemployment
temporarily rises in response to an immigration shock, although the implications for
different sections of the labor market differ across scenarios.
In this paper we treat immigration shocks as shocks to the labor supply and analyze
their effects on the macroeconomy. As well as being intuitive, this interpretation of
immigration is also consistent with the history of US immigration policy and the time
series of its working population. Hatton (2015)’s analysis of US immigration policy
finds that much immigration was unanticipated and that the effects of changes in policy
were often the opposite to those intended by the policymakers.2 ,3 We also show that the
time series of the US working population, once corrected for the changes predicted by
historical birth rate data, corresponds quite closely to immigration levels as measured
by new permanent residents.4
The analysis and results of the paper are of interest for two distinct reasons. Firstly
the macroeconomic DSGE literature has not paid the same level of attention to the de-
terminants of the size of the working populations as it has to individual labor supply
decisions.5 This paper attempts to redress this imbalance by focussing on the macroeco-
2For example with regard to the 1965 Immigration Act, Hatton (2015) argues that the intention
of the act was to increase the proportion of European migrants by expanding the family reunification
immigration route, but the act actually had the opposite effect.
3Although some immigration may be anticipated, see e.g., Khraiche (2015). We analyze this case in
section 4.2 below.
4As the work of Ramey (2011) details, correcting for anticipated changes in macroeconomic analysis
is necessary to remove potential biases. See also Brezis and Ferreira (2016) and Doepke, Hazan and
Maoz (2015) for the macroeconomic effects of endogenous fertility and the baby boom.
5For surveys of the literature see e.g., Uhlig (1999) or Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans (2005).
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nomic effects of immigration which, as noted above, has added over 30 million people to
the US labor force since 1970 and is therefore one of the key determinants of changes in
the total labor supply. Similarly while there is a large microeconomic literature on the
effects of immigration on the labor market, there has been much less from a macroeco-
nomic perspective.6 There are good reasons for thinking that the macroeconomy is an
appropriate level of analysis for investigating the effects of immigration. In a developed
and integrated economy such as the US an inflow of labor into one region will affect the
investment and labor flow into other regions and therefore the aggregate macroeconomy.
If it makes sense to think of a macro economy with an aggregate production function,
an aggregate capital stock, aggregate labor supply and an economy wide level of pro-
ductivity then it makes sense to look at the effects of changes in the aggregate labor
force.
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we present and discuss the data on
immigration in the US since 1950. In section 3 we outline the model. Section 4 discusses
the results of the simulation. Section 5 concludes.
2 Trends in US Working Population and Immigra-
tion
Immigration itself is not a factor of production. However, as we show in this section the
time series of changes in the US working population, which are not predicted by historical
birth rate data, corresponds quite closely to immigration levels as measured by the series
for new permanent residents. Thus it is reasonable to consider an immigration shock as
a shock to the working population as we do in the macroeconomic model below. In this
section we first discuss the recent growth of the working population in the US and relate
it to growth of immigration as measured by new permanent residents. We then show in a
macroeconomic VAR that shocks to immigration are associated with temporary increases
in unemployment and also short run increases in investment and decreases in GDP per
6See e.g., Card and Peri (2016) and Manacorda, Manning and Wadsworth (2012) for an excellent
survey of the microeconomic literature. There is also a related macroeconomic literature on the macroe-
conomic effects of demographic change, see e.g., Bokan, Hughes Hallett, and Jensen (2016) and Sasaki
and Hoshida (2016) on the effect of falling and even negative population growth for technological progress
and debt dynamics. Kiguchi (2015) also analyzes the macroeconomic impacts of a policy of increasing
population growth in response to an unexpected increase in the debt to GDP ratio.
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capita and consumption, responses which are consistent with those of the macroeconomic
model in section 3 below.
Changes in the Working Population and Immigration
Modern macroeconomic empirical and theoretical analysis describes macroeconomic fluc-
tuations as responses to unanticipated changes in macroeconomic fundamentals. Birth
data are publicly available and so a large proportion of the changes in the working pop-
ulation are not unanticipated as they can be observed 16 years ahead of time. Thus for
consistency with the macroeconomic model in section 3 below we remove this predictable
element from the working population series and construct an unanticipated change in
population series using the series for working population in the US of Cociuba, Prescott
and Ueberfeldt (2009) as a base.7,8 If one compares this series with the series for new
permanent residents in the US then one finds that although changes in the working
population and new immigration flows are logically distinct, empirically they are highly
related. The series have a similar pattern in that they both show a gradual rise from
the 1950’s to the 1980’s and then a large increase in the latter period of the 1980’s. The
series are also similar in scale. Over the sample period 1950-2005 the cumulative unantic-
ipated changes in the working population is approximately 38.2 million with 17.8 million
occurring since 1990. The corresponding numbers for the new permanent residents se-
ries are 31.9 million and 15.7 million. One should not expect a perfect correspondence
7The construction uses the following formula
WPopUt = WPopt −WPop
A
t
where WPopAt = (1− δ
65
t−1 −mort
16−64
t−1 )WPopt−1 + (1−mort
1−15
t−16 )Birthst−16
where the WPopt is the series for working population in the US is taken from Cociuba, Prescott and
Ueberfeldt (2009), WPopAt is the anticipated working population in time which is equal to the previous
year’s working population minus the proportion aged 64 who will retire, δ65t−1, and the mortality rate
of the working population plus the births from 16 years previously also adjusted for mortality. The
adjustments are based on decennial averages and so are a little arbitrary but they serve their purpose.
8The sources of the data are the Centre for Disease Control’s National Centre for Health statis-
tics website <http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/>. Specifically for age specific mortality rates the data are
from <http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/nvss/mortality/hist290a.htm>. For birth data the web address is
<https://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/statab/natfinal2003.annvol1 01.pdf>. The age distribution data is
only available from the census from the website <http://www.census.gov/prod/www/decennial.html>.
Since the census data is only decennial data we use linear interpolations to calculate the mortality rate
of 1-15 years olds, 16-64 year olds and the proportion of retirees in the population in the formula above.
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between these two series since one can attain new permanent resident status and not
be part of the working population and vice versa. However the similarity between them
is reassuring. To illustrate this we run a simple second order bivariate VAR of the two
series and display the impulse responses in Figure 1. This shows that a positive shock
to one series is associated with a positive shock to the other series.
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Figure 1: The correlation between the time series of new permanent residents and unanticipated
working population series as illustrated by the Impulse Responses from a bivariate VAR identified by
a Cholesky ordering with the unanticipated working population series ordered last. The one standard
deviation confidence bands are shown.
Macroeconomic VAR
In this section we look at the empirical effects of immigration shocks using a VAR.
We identify an immigration shock using sign restrictions and the condition that it is
orthogonal to a business cycle shock which is also identified using sign restrictions. The
impulses show that an immigration shock is associated with a temporary increase in
unemployment and also temporary increases in investment and decreases in GDP per
capita and consumption per capita which is consistent with the impulses in the theoretical
model below.
We estimate an 8 dimensional VAR with annual data from 1950 to 2005 for the
following variables; GDP, private consumption, non-residential investment, residential in-
vestment, unemployment, hours worked, real wages, and the numbers of new permanent
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Figure 2: Impulse Responses to a business cycle shock identified via sign restrictions. The sign
restrictions are indicated by the shaded areas. The one standard deviation confidence bands are shown.
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Figure 3: Impulse Responses to an immigration shock identified via sign restrictions and orthogonality
to the business cycle shock. The sign restrictions are indicated by the shaded areas. The one standard
deviation confidence bands are shown.
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residents.9 All variables are real and, with the exception of the wage series, expressed
as per capita of the working population. The VAR has 2 lags, and uses the logarithm of
the levels of all variables. The impulses responses of a business cycle shock are displayed
in Figure 2 and those of the immigration shock are shown in Figure 3.
The business cycle shock is identified using a penalty function to restrict the signs
of the responses of GDP per capita, consumption per capita, non-residential investment
and hours to be positive and unemployment to be negative for two years after the shock.
This approach allows the business cycle shock to explain the greatest amount of variation
in these variables, see Mountford and Uhlig (2009) and more recently Caldara, Fuentes-
Albero, Gilchrist and Zakraj˘sek (2016) for examples of this approach. Note that the
identification does not restrict the response of immigration to this shock which is thus
free to be either positive or negative. As Figure 2 shows there is some evidence that
immigration is procyclical although the responses are not quite statistically significant.
The immigration shock is identified as being orthogonal to the business cycle shock
and using a penalty function to restrict the signs of the responses of immigration to be
positive for two years after the shock. These responses thus capture that part of the
variation in the time series which is not explained by the business cycle shock and
which is related to an increase in immigration. The responses in Figure 3 show that
unemployment temporarily rises in response to an immigration shock. This is consistent
with the responses to an immigration shock in the macroeconomic model described in the
following section where unemployment rises in response to a shock before job vacancies
respond sufficiently and unemployment converges back to its steady state level. The
responses of GDP and consumption per member of the working population also resemble
those from the model below. They initially fall as the denominator of their respective
quotients increases faster than the numerator. They then recover as employment and
output rise allowing their respective numerators to rise.
9The series or the macroeconomic data is taken from the FRED database and is series GDPXA,
PCECCA, B008RG3A086NBEA, B011RG3A086NBEA, COMPRNFB, UNRATE with the exception
of the working population and the hours worked series which come from Cociuba, Prescott and
Ueberfeldt (2009) and the new permanent residents series which comes from the US Department
of Homeland Security <https://www.dhs.gov/publication/yearbook-immigration-statistics-2012-legal-
permanent-residents>.
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3 AMacroeconomic Model with Immigration Shocks
In this section we analyze a macroeconomic model with immigration shocks. We show
that while immigration shocks ultimately lead to job creation, in the short term they
lead to temporary increases in unemployment and to temporary reductions in GDP per
capita and consumption per capita. The increases in unemployment are not evenly
spread across groups and those with a higher match finding probability may see their
unemployment rate fall in response to an immigration shock.
The model extends the Bru¨ckner and Pappa (2012) (BP) model, to allow for im-
migration. The model includes households, firms (intermediate and retail), and a gov-
ernment which conducts both monetary and fiscal policy. Each household consists of a
continuum of infinitely-lived employed workers, two types of unemployed workers (the
short term and the long term unemployed), and non-participants. The short term and
long term unemployed have differing job matching probabilities and job finding rates.
Our baseline scenario assumes that migrants enter the labor market as unemployed work-
ers with a low job matching probability and so that immigration is an exogenous shock
to the number of unemployed workers. However we also examine scenarios where im-
migrants enter with a job and where they enter with a high job matching probability.
We can interpret employment-based immigration as the case where employers sponsor
immigrant workers for green cards based on their employment, while insider immigration
can be viewed as immigration through a family member (i.e., family reunifications). In
each of these cases total unemployment temporarily rises in response to an immigration
shock, although the different initial position of the migrant in the labor market does ef-
fect particular sections of the labor market differently, as we will show below. Households
supply labor services to the intermediate firms and earn wages when employed. When
unemployed, households search for jobs and earn unemployment benefit, or enjoy leisure
if not participating in a labor market. Intermediate firms hire workers in a frictional
labor market, i.e., they increase their current workforce by posting vacancies, which is
costly. They then produce intermediate goods by using capital and labor and sell the
products to retailers, which differentiate them and sell to households in a competitive
market. In the following, we explain the details of the model.
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3.1 The Labor Force with Immigration
At any time of t, the number of household members who are employed is denoted by
Et, the number of short term unemployed (referred to as insiders) is denoted by U
I
t , the
number of long-term unemployed (referred to as outsiders) is denoted by UOt , and the
number of non-participants (i.e., out of labor force) is denoted by Lt.
At the beginning of the period we assume that there is an exogenous flow of
immigratants into the host economy. In our baseline scenario we assume that newly
immigrated people are likely to have less chances of finding jobs and so we treat them
as outsiders in the labor market. We denote the number of migrants at time t as Migt,
and assume that this follows a stationary stochastic process. The total population in the
domestic economy, Nt, is therefore given by
Nt = Et + U
I
t + U
O
t +Migt + Lt,
or equivalently,
1 = et + u
I
t + u
O
t +migt + lt, (1)
where et, u
I
t , u
O
t , migt, and lt are proportions in the total population. In period t+1, the
number of Migt+1 are newly immigrated in the domestic economy, and therefore, the
total population of the domestic economy evolves as
Nt+1 = Nt +Migt+1
⇔
Nt+1
Nt
=
1
1−migt+1
=: ζNt+1.
3.2 Matching
The aggregate number of matches in the economy,Mt, is given by the sum of the constant-
returns-to-scale matching function of insiders and of outsiders. The inputs to these
matching functions are the vacancies that firms create and unemployed workers.
Mt =M
I
t (Vt, U
I
t ) +M
O
t (Vt, U
O
t +Migt)
=ρImV
α
t (u
I
tNt)
1−α + ρOmV
α
t ((u
O
t +migt)Nt)
1−α,
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where Vt is the aggregate vacancy, and ρ
I
m > ρ
O
m > 0 is assumed. That is, insiders enjoy
a more efficient matching technology than outsiders. The parameter α ∈ (0, 1) is the
elasticity of the matching function with respect to vacancies. The aggregate job finding
rates for insiders and outsiders are defined respectively as
γIht :=
M It
uItNt
, (2)
γOht :=
MOt
(uOt +migt)Nt
, (3)
and γht := γ
Ih
t + γ
Oh
t . The aggregate vacancy filling rate is
γft :=
Mt
Vt
.
Using the job finding rates defined above, the transition equation for employment is
expressed as
Et+1 = (1− σ)Et +M
I
t +M
O
t
⇔ e˜t+1Nt = (1− σ)etNt + γ
Ih
t u
I
tNt + γ
Oh
t (u
O
t +migt)Nt, (4)
where σ ∈ (0, 1) is the exogenous job destruction rate, and e˜t := Et/Nt−1 represents
employment per person at the beginning of time t. Similarly, the transition for insiders
is given by
U It+1 = (1− µ)U
I
t + σEt −M
I
t
⇔ u˜It+1Nt = (1− µ)u
I
tNt + σetNt − γ
Ih
t u
I
tNt, (5)
where µ ∈ (0, 1) is the probability of becoming outsiders and u˜It := U
I
t /Nt−1.
3.3 Household
The household’s total instantaneous utility function takes the form
u(ct, lt)Nt =
(
c1−ηt
1− η
+ Φ
l1−ζt
1− ζ
)
Nt,
where ct is the consumption of each member of the household at time t, lt, is defined
in (1), and is the fraction of non-participants who enjoy leisure, 1/η is the intertem-
poral elasticity of substitution, ζ is the inverse of the Frisch elasticity of labor supply,
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Φ > 0 is a preference parameter that measures the disutility from being in the labor
market. As is common in the macroeconomic literature, full risk sharing among house-
hold members is assumed so that they can insure themselves against income uncertainty
and unemployment.10 The household’s problem is expressed as
J (kt, et, u
I
t , bt) = max
ct,kt+1,bt+1,et+1,u
I
t+1
,uO
t
(
c1−ηt
1− η
+ Φ
l1−ζt
1 − ζ
)
Nt
+ βEtJ (kt+1, et+1, u
I
t+1, bt+1)
subject to total population (1), the job finding rates for insiders (2) and those of outsiders
and (3), the law of motion for employed workers (4) and that of insiders (5), the following
budget constraint (6), and the capital accumulation equation with adjustment costs (7):
ctNt + itNt +
bt+1Nt+1
ptRt
≤ rtktNt + wtetNt + ben(u
I
t + u
O
t (1 +migt))Nt +
btNt
pt
+ protNt − ttNt, (6)
k˜t+1Nt =(1− δ)ktNt + itNt −
ω
2
(
k˜t+1
kt
− ζN
)2
ktNt, (7)
where it is investment, bt is the government bond, Rt is the gross nominal interest rate,
pt is price level, wt is real wage, rt is the rental rate of capital, ben is unemployment
benefits, prot is profits from firms, tt is lump sum taxes, kt is capital, δ ∈ (0, 1) is the
depreciation rate, ω captures the degree of adjustment costs, and k˜t := Kt/Nt−1.
As is common in the literature,11 we define the marginal value to the household
of having one member employed rather than unemployed, and that of being insider
unemployed by using the first-order conditions to the household’s problem above as
follows:
V Et = −Φl
−ζ
t Nt + c
−η
t wtNt + (1− σ)βEt
V Et+1
ζNt+1
+ σβEt
V UIt+1
ζNt+1
, (8)
V UIt = −Φl
−ζ
t Nt + c
−η
t benNt + γ
Ih
t βEt
V Et+1
ζNt+1
+ ((1− µ)− γIht )βEt
V UIt+1
ζNt+1
(9)
The marginal value to the household of an employed worker consists of the disutility from
being in the labor market, −∂u(ct, lt)Nt/∂lt = −Φl
−ζ
t Nt, the wage rates, wt, multiplied
10See, e.g., Merz (1995) and Andolfatto (1996).
11See, e.g., Ravn (2008), Shimer (2010) and Silva and Toledo (2009).
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by the marginal utility of wealth c−ηt and the total numbers in household members, Nt,
and the continuation value, which is the value of being employed if the match is not
terminated, which occurs with the probability (1 − σ), and the value of becoming an
insider if it is destroyed, which occurs with the probability σ. The continuation value is
discounted by the discount factor, β, and adjusted by the expected population growth
rate ζNt+1. Similarly, the marginal value to the household of being an insider consists of
the disutility from being in the labor market, and unemployment benefit, ben, and the
continuation value. Note that an insider finds a job with the probability γIht , as defined
in (2), and remains an insider with the probability ((1−µ)−γIht ) since an insider becomes
an outsider with the probability µ.
3.4 Intermediate Firms
Intermediate firms employ the aggregate household’s labor Et and aggregate capital, Kt,
to produce goods.12 The production function is given by:
Yt = F (Kt, Et) = K
ϕ
t (Et)
1−ϕ,
where ϕ ∈ (0, 1) is the elasticity of output with respect to capital. The value function
of a firm with Et currently employed workers is:
V(Et) = max
Kt,Vt
xtF (Kt, Et)− wtEt − rtKt − κVt + EtΛt+1V((1− σ)Et + γ
f
t Vt︸ ︷︷ ︸
=Et+1
), (10)
where xt is the relative price of intermediate goods, Λt+1 = βuct+1/uct is the stochastic
discount factor, and κ > 0 is the cost of posting vacancies. The first-order conditions for
Kt and Vt are;
[Kt] : ϕ xt
Yt
Kt
= rt,
[Vt] :
κ
γft
= βEt
(
ct
ct+1
)η
V Ft+1, (11)
where V Ft is the value of filling a vacancy which is defined as
V Ft := (1− ϕ)xt
Yt
Et
− wt + (1− σ)
κ
γft
. (12)
12The production function only has capital and labor as inputs and so abstracts from the effect of
immigration in an economy with land as in e.g., Mountford (2004).
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Therefore, the optimal vacancy condition (11), together with (12), states that the marginal
cost of positing a vacancy should equal the expected marginal benefit, which is the
marginal product of labor minus the wage plus the continuation value, knowing that the
match can be terminated with probability σ.
3.5 Bargaining over Wages
The solution to the Nash bargaining problem can be written as the maximization of the
weighted sum of log post-match surpluses:
max
wt
(1− ϑ) lnV Et + ϑ lnV
F
t ,
where ϑ ∈ (0, 1) denotes the firms’ bargaining power. The first-order condition with
respect to wt leads to the following Nash wage equation:
wt = (1− ϑ)
[
(1− ϕ)xt
yt
et
+
κγOht
γft
]
+ ϑ[ben − cηtσβEtV
UI
t+1]. (13)
The equilibrium Nash bargained wage is thus the weighted average of the marginal
product of labor plus the value to the firm of marginal job (κ/γft ), multiplied by the
vacancy filling rate for an outsider, and the outside option of being unemployed minus
the expected value of becoming an insider next period if the match is destroyed.
3.6 Retailers and Price Setting and Equilibrium Conditions
There is a continuum of monopolistically competitive retailers indexed by i ∈ [0, 1], which
buy intermediate goods and differentiate them with a technology that transforms one
unit of intermediate goods into one unit of retail goods. The relative price of intermediate
goods, xt, coincides with the real marginal cost that the retailers face. Final goods are
expressed as the composite of individual retail goods Yit:
Yt =
[∫ 1
0
Y
ǫ−1
ǫ
it di
] ǫ
ǫ−1
,
where ǫ > 1 is the elasticity of substitution between intermediate goods. Retail firms
can optimize their price with a fixed probability 1 − χp ∈ (0, 1) in any period following
Calvo (1983), which will lead to the standard New Keynesian Phillips Curve:13
13See, e.g., Gal´ı (2008) for the derivation.
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πt = βEtπt+1 + λx̂t,
where πt is the inflation rate of prices of retail goods, and λ = (1 − βχ
p)(1 − χp)/χp.
A ‘hat’ over the marginal cost denotes the deviation from the steady state. Monetary
policy follows an interest rate rule:
Rt = R exp(ζpiπt).
The government finances the expenditure on unemployment benefits and government
spending by lump sum tax,
ben Ut +Gt = Tt.
and finally the resource constraint of the economy is given by
Yt = Ct + It +Gt + κVt.
4 Simulation
4.1 Parameter Values
In the baseline calibration, we take the period in the model to correspond to a quarter and
set the model parameters to fit the U.S. economy. The values are taken from Bru¨ckner
and Pappa (2012) and are sumarized in Table 1. The new parameter introduced here,
the steady-state immigration rate, mig, is set to 0.0057/4, following Ben-Gad (2012).
The implies annual (gross) population growth rate is about 1.0057.
It is assumed that the discount factor β = 0.99 (implying an annualized steady-
state real interest rate of approximately 4 percent), the relative risk aversion parameter
η = 2, the capital share ϕ = 0.3, the Frisch elasticity of labor supply ζ= 4, the elasticity
of substitution ǫ = 6 (implying a gross steady-state markup is equal to 1.2), the degree
of price stickiness χp = 0.75 (implying an average price duration of four quarters), and
the capital depreciation rate δ = 0.01 (implying annual depreciation rate of 4 percent),
the capital adjustment cost ω = 2, the coefficient on inflation in the interest rate rule
ζpi = 1.5, and the steady-state value for government spending to output ratio g/y = 0.18.
For the labor market, total unemployment rate is set to 0.055, and according to
CPS data, the share of the long-term unemployed in total unemployment is set to 0.16.
We use the aggregate job finding rate γh = 0.83. The aggregate vacancy filling rate γf
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is set equal to 2/3, and the participation rate is equal to 1 − l = 0.62. The bargaining
power of firms is set to 0.4. The Hosios (1990) condition is used to pin down the matching
elasticity, so α = ϑ. Unemployment benefits ben and the average cost of hiring a worker
κ are chosen to hit the target of 40 percent and 4.5 percent of the average quarterly wage
of employed workers.
Table 1: Parameter Values
Parameter Value Description
m 0.0057/4 steady state immigration rate
u/(n+ u) 0.055 total unemployment rate
uO/u 0.16 share of outsiders in total unemployment
γh 0.83 aggregate job finding rate
γf 2/3 aggregate vacancy filling rate
1− l 0.62 participation rate
ϑ 0.4 relative bargaining power
α 0.4 elasticity of matching
ben/w 0.4 replacement rate
k/w 0.045 cost of vacancies as a % real wage
β 0.99 discount factor
ϕ 0.3 capital share
δ 0.01 capital depreciation rate
ζ 4 elasticity of labor supply
η 2 inverse of IES
ω 2 capital adjustment cost
x = ǫ/(ǫ− 1) 1.2 gross steady state markup
χp 0.75 degree of price stickiness
g/y 0.18 gov cons to GDP ratio
ζpi 1.5 Taylor rule coefficient on inflation
4.2 The Effects of Immigration Shocks
In this section we analyze the effects of an immigration shock to the macroeconomy.
The immigration shock is an increase of 20 percent in ǫmigt+1 in equation (a) in Table
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2 in Appendix A, which corresponds to an initial increase of about 0.03 percent in
population. The autoregressive coefficient, ρm, is set to 0.75. These values are chosen to
roughly capture the immigration shock in Figure 3.
We first present the benchmark case where migrants enter as outsiders in the labor
market, and wages are flexible. The impulse responses to this case are displayed in Fig-
ure 4. We then discuss the case where wages are rigid and again where migrants enter
as outsiders in the labor market. The impulses to this case are displayed in Figure 5.
In both cases the effect of immigration shocks is to temporarily increase unemployment
with the effect being large and more persistent under rigid wages than under flexible
wages. In Appendix B, we also consider the cases where migrants enter as insiders in
the labor market and enter as employed workers. In each case immigration shocks lead
to a temporary increase in unemployment although the distribution of unemployment
across outsiders and insiders differs across the specifications. Finally we consider antici-
pated immigration. The responses for this case are displayed in Figure 6 and show that
unemployment and vacancies also rise in this case but on announcement i.e. before the
working population itself actually rises.
Figure 4 displays the short-run dynamics of twelve macroeconomic variables (GDP,
consumption, capital, total unemployment, insider unemployment, outsider unemploy-
ment, employment, real wage, investment, vacancy, participation rate, and immigration)
produced by the benchmark model. It shows that an immigration shock generates an
instantaneous rise in outsider unemployment, by assumption in this case, and this leads
to a fall in the job finding rate for outsiders (not shown). The decline in job finding rate
for outsiders causes the real wage to decline following the Nash bargaining equation (13).
This in turn creates an incentive for firms to post more job vacancies since the marginal
benefit of positing vacancies, and hence, the value of filling a vacancy has increased. As
insiders have a higher matching probability they also have a higher job finding rate and so
the unemployment rate amongst insiders falls. However the unemployment of outsiders
increases and for total unemployment this effect dominates. Thus both employment and
the total unemployment increase temporarily. Immigration also causes a reduction in
capital per person (the “capital dilution effect”). This creates another downward force
on real wages and causes households to reduce consumption and increase labor supply
in order to increase investment and rebuild capital. Consequently GDP per capita and
consumption per capita fall, and participation rates rise in response to an immigration
shock. Interesting this was also the case in the maximum likelihood responses in the
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Figure 4: Dynamic Responses to an Immigration Shock: Benchmark
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VAR, which are shown in Figure 3.
Rigid Wages
The possibility of rigid wages is regarded by many to be a more realistic description of the
labor market. The literature has also shown how wage rigidity can help explain important
labor market and macroeconomic phenomena. Notable examples include unemployment
variability over the business cycle, Hall (2005), inflation and unemployment dynamics,
Blanchard and Gal´ı (2010), and asset price behavior, Uhlig (2007). It is thus natural
that we consider how wage rigidity impacts on our analysis of the effect of immigration
shocks on the macroeconomy. We find that wage rigidity reinforces the findings of the
baseline scenario in that the unemployment caused by immigration shocks is both higher
and more persistent than in the baseline case.
We introduce a simple wage rigidity rule to the benchmark model following Shimer
(2010).The wage is expressed as a weighted average of the wage in the previous period
and the Nash bargained wage in this period:
wt = χ
wwt−1 + (1− χ
w)wNasht ,
where χw ∈ [0, 1] denotes the degree of wage stickiness and wNasht is a Nash bargained
wage given by (13). When χw = 0, wages are flexible, and therefore, the model corre-
sponds to the benchmark one.
Figure 5 plots the impulse responses following a shock to immigration in the pres-
ence of the wage rigidity for alternative parameter for wage rigidity, χw = 0 (baseline),
0.5, or 0.9. According to Figure 5, the presence of wage rigidity leads to more grad-
ual declines in real wage, and so a smaller increase in job vacancies. Consequently, as
stated, the unemployment rate of insiders as well as total unemployment are higher and
more persistent in response to an immigration shock than in the baseline, flexible wage,
scenario.
Anticipated Migration
The model is also able to analyze anticipated immigration where there is no initial
immigration but where immigration is expected in the future. Hanson and McIntosh
(2010, 2012) argue that anticipated immigration plays a role in immigration to the US
from Mexico and Latin America. Figure 6 plots the impulse responses following an
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Figure 5: Dynamic Responses to an Immigration Shock with Rigid Wages
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anticipated shock to immigration where immigration only starts to occur in a year’s
time. The same effects are still present in this case as with the unanticipated ones
above. Anticipated immigration still causes unemployment, vacancies and investment to
rise for the same reasons as above. However the difference in this case is that they now
rise on announcement i.e., before the increase in working population actually occurs.
This leads GDP per capita to rise on impact, only declining when the immigrants arrive.
Note that the sign restriction methodology for the empirical VAR in section 2 restricts
signs over a two year period and so capture both anticipated and unanticipated shocks
with its identification strategy. The impulses responses in Figure 3 are closer to those
in Figure 4 for an unanticipated immigration shock than those in Figure 6 which may
imply that unanticipated shocks are the more relevant empirically.
5 Conclusion
In this paper we have argued that post-war immigration into the United States can
be treated as an autoregressive process whose innovations are shocks to the US work-
ing population. We have analyzed the effects of immigration shocks using a dynamic
macroeconomic model with search and matching frictions and shown how immigration
shocks lead to a temporary rise in unemployment and a temporary fall in GDP per
capita. Results which are consistent with both the data and intuition.
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Figure 6: Dynamic Responses to an Anticipated Immigration Shock
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Appendix
A. List of Log-linearized Equations
We log-linearize per-capita equations around the steady state. We denote log-deviations
by hats over variables so that for a generic aggregate variable Xt, x̂t = log(xt)− log(x) ≈
(x˜t−x)/x where xt := Xt/Nt and x is the steady state value of xt. The only exception is
the inflation rate, πt, which is expressed as a percentage deviation from the steady state
of zero inflation, so that π̂t = πt. The log-linearized dynamics of the model is shown in
Table 2 on the following page. Equations (1) to (27) determine 27 endogenous variables:
yt, ct, it, kt, k˜t, rt, et, e˜t, u
I
t , u˜
I
t , u
O
t , lt, wt, Rt, xt, πt, m
I
t , m
O
t , vt, γ
Ih
t , γ
Oh
t , γ
If
t , γ
Of
t , γ
f
t , λet,
λut, ζ
N
t . Equation (a) represents an exogenous process.
Table 2: The Log-Linearized Equations of the Model (log-deviations are denoted by hats)
(1) ̂˜et+1 = (1−σζN ) êt + ( mIe ζN ) m̂It + ( mOe ζN ) m̂Ot
(2) êt = ̂˜et − ζ̂Nt
(3) m̂It = αv̂t + (1− α)û
I
t
(4) m̂Ot = α v̂t + (1− α)
[
uO
uO+mig
ûOt +
mig
uO+mig
m̂igt
]
(5) γ̂Iht = m̂
I
t − û
I
t
(6) γ̂Oht = m̂
O
t −
uO
uO+mig
ûOt −
mig
uO+mig
m̂igt
(7)
̂˜
kt+1 =
(
1−δ
ζN
)
k̂t +
(
1− 1−δ
ζN
)
ît
(8) k̂t =
̂˜
kt − ζ̂
N
t
(9) ̂˜uIt+1 = (1−µζN ) ûIt + σ ( euIζN ) êt − ( mIuIζN ) m̂It
(10) ûIt =
̂˜uIt − ζ̂Nt
(11) 0 = eêt + u
I ûIt + u
O ûOt +mig m̂igt + ll̂t
(12) η
β
ĉt +
ωζN
β
k̂t = Et
[
η
β
ĉt+1 − rr̂t+1 − ω(ζ
N )2
̂˜
kt+2 +
wζN
β
̂˜
kt+1 + ω(ζ
N )2k̂t+1
]
(13) γ
Ohλe
γOhλe+c−ηben
(γ̂Oht + λ̂et)−
c−ηbenη
γOhλe+c−ηben
ĉt = −ζl̂t
(14) λuλ̂ut = βEt[−c
−ηbenηĉt+1 + γ
Ihλeλ̂et+1 + λu[(1 − µ)− γ
Ih]λ̂ut+1
+γIh[λe − λu]γ̂
Ih
t+1 +Φl
−ζζl̂t+1]
(15) λeλ̂et = βEt[−ηc
−ηwĉt+1 + c
−ηwŵt+1 + (1 − σ)λeλ̂nt+1 + σλuλ̂ut+1 +Φl
−ζζl̂t+1]
(16) ĉt = Etĉt+1 −
1
η
(R̂t − Etπ̂t+1)
(17) ŷt = ϕk̂t + (1− ϕ)êt
(18) γ̂Ift = m̂
I
t − v̂t
(19) γ̂Oft = m̂
O
t − v̂t
(20) κ
βγf
γ̂ft +
κη
βγf
ĉt =
κη
βγf
Etĉt+1 + (1− ϕ)x
y
e
Et(êt+1 − x̂t+1 − ŷt+1) + wEtŵt+1 + (1 − σ)
κ
γf
Etγ̂
f
t+1
(21) wŵt = (1− ϑ)(1 − ϕ)x
y
e
(x̂t + ŷt − êt)− ζϑc
ηΦl−ζ l̂t − ϑc
ησλuλ̂ut + ϑc
ηη(Φl−ζ − σλu)ĉt
(22) r̂t = x̂t + ŷt − k̂t
(23) γf γ̂ft = γ
If γ̂Ift + γ
Of γ̂Oft
(24) πt = βEtπt+1 + λx̂t
(25) R̂t = ζpiπt
(26) ζ̂Nt+1 = (mig/(1−mig))m̂igt+1
(27) ŷt =
c
y
ĉt +
i
y
ît + κ
v
y
v̂t +
g
y
ĝt
Exogenous Processes
(a) m̂igt+1 = ρm m̂igt + ǫ
mig
t+1
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B. Extensions of the Model
In this section, we extend the baseline model in two ways. Firstly, by assuming that
immigrants enter a host economy with jobs and secondly by assuming that immigrants
enter as insiders. In each case the result of the paper that immigration shocks lead to
a temporary increase in unemployment continues to hold although the distribution of
unemployment across outsiders and insiders differs across the different specifications.
B1. Immigration with Jobs
If we consider an increase in immigration as an exogenous shock to the number of em-
ployed workers, then the transition of equation for employed workers is rewritten as
Et+1 = (1− σ)Et + (1− µ1)Migt +M
I
t +M
O
t
⇔ e˜t+1 = (1− σ)et + (1− µ1)migt +m
I
t +m
O
t ,
where µ1 ∈ (0, 1) is the exogenous job separation rate. We assume that immigrants
become outsiders when their jobs are terminated. The first-order conditions for house-
hold’s problem are unaffected to this change. The Cobb-Douglas production function is
now given by
Yt = K
ϕ
t (Et +Migt)
1−ϕ.
Thus, the marginal product of labor now becomes;
MPLt :=
∂Yt
∂Et
= (1− ϕ)
Yt
Et +Migt
= (1− ϕ)
yt
et +migt
.
Note that an increase in immigration leads to a fall in the marginal product of labor if
other things are equal. The resulting optimal vacancy posting condition is
κ
γft
= βEt
(
ct
ct+1
)η [
(1− ϕ)
yt+1
et+1 +migt+1
− wt+1 + (1− σ)
κ
γft+1
]
,
and Nash bargained wage is
wt = (1− ϑ)
[
(1− ϕ)xt
yt
et +migt
+
κγOht
γft
]
+ ϑben − ϑcηt σβEtV
UI
t .
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An increase in employed immigration has two counteracting effects on job vacancies.
On one hand, it creates more incentives for firms to post vacancies by reducing the
marginal product of labor, and hence, wage. On the other hand, the decrease in the
marginal product of labor caused by employed immigration creates less incentives to
open vacancies by reducing the marginal benefit of posting them.
The corresponding log-linearized equations are now given by
̂˜et+1 =(1− σ
ζN
)
êt +
(
mig
e ζN
)
m̂igt +
(
mI
e ζN
)
m̂It +
(
mO
e ζN
)
m̂Ot ,
ŷt =ϕk̂t + (1− ϕ)
[
e
e +mig
êt +
mig
e+mig
m̂igt
]
,
κ
βγf
γ̂ft +
κη
βγf
ĉt =
κη
βγf
Etĉt+1 + (1− ϕ)
y
e+mig
Et
[(
e
e +mig
êt +
mig
e +mig
m̂igt
)
− x̂t+1 − ŷt+1
]
+ wEtŵt+1 + (1− σ)
κ
γf
Etγ̂
f
t+1,
wŵt =(1− ϑ)(1− ϕ)x
y
e +mig
[
x̂t + ŷt −
(
e
e+mig
êt +
mig
e+mig
m̂igt
))
− ζϑcηΦl−ζ l̂t − ϑc
ησλuλ̂ut + ϑc
ηη(Φl−ζ − σλu)ĉt.
Figure 7 displays impulse responses to an immigration shock of the same magnitude
as the baseline, but now immigrants are assumed to enter as employed workers. This
employed immigration shock leads to a fall in real wage, which is similar to the prediction
of the baseline model of outsider-immigrants. However, the model with employed im-
migrants predicts a decrease in job vacancies, while the model with outsider-immigrants
predicts the opposite. In the baseline model, as is explained in Subsection 4.2, the main
reason why an immigration shock increases job vacancies is that it causes job finding rate
for outsiders to fall, which leads to negative pressure on real wage and a positive pressure
on vacancies. In the model with employed immigrations, the effect of a reduction in the
marginal benefit of posting vacancy due to a fall in the marginal product of labor dom-
inates the effect of an increase in the marginal benefit due to a fall in real wage, and as
a result of that, job vacancies decrease. This reduction of vacancies makes it harder for
insiders to find jobs, and hence, unemployment of insiders increases. Unemployment of
outsiders also increases on the impact. This is because non-participants reduces leisure
and enter the labor market in order to increase consumption. However, it turns into
slightly below the steady state by reflecting the fact they leave labor market and become
non-participants. As a consequence, the model with employed immigration generates a
slightly smaller impacts on total unemployment.
Figure 7: Immigration with Employment
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B2. Immigration as Insiders
Next, we turn to the case where immigrations enter a host economy as insiders. In this
case, the matching function for insiders is now given by
M It = ρ
I
mV
α
t [(u
I
t +migt)Nt]
1−α,
and hence, the job finding rate for insiders is
γIh =
M It
(uIt +migt)Nt
=
mIt
uIt +migt
.
The law of motion for insiders is replaced by
U It+1 = (1− µ)U
I
t + σEt −M
I
t + (1− µ2)Migt
⇔ u˜It+1 = (1− µ)u
I
t + σet − γ
Ih
t u
I
t + (1− µ2)migt,
where µ2 ∈ (0, 1) is the probability that immigrants become outsiders.
As a result, the corresponding log-linearized equations are now replaced by
m̂It = α v̂t + (1− α)
[
uI
uI +mig
ûIt +
mig
uI +mig
m̂igt
]
,
γ̂Iht = m̂
I
t −
uI
uI +mig
ûIt −
mig
uI +mig
m̂igt,
̂˜uIt+1 = (1− µζN
)
ûIt + σ
(
e
uIζN
)
êt −
(
mI
uIζN
)
m̂It + (1− µ2)
(
mig
uIζN
)
m̂igt.
Figure 8 shows the dynamic responses to an immigration shock with the assumption
that they enter a host economy as insiders. The magnitude of the shock as the same as the
baseline model. For comparison, the responses of the baseline model are also displayed.
An increase in immigration generates an increase in unemployment of insiders as we have
assumed. On the impact, real wage falls due to a fall in the marginal value of being an
insider, leading to an instantaneous rise in vacancies. After that, however, vacancies
show a gradual decrease and turn into slightly below the steady state level since the
marginal cost of a vacancy increases gradually due to a fall in the vacancy filling rate
(not shown). Unemployment of outsiders also declines gradually slightly after an initial
rise, reflecting the fact that job finding rate for outsiders decline since some of them leave
the labor market. Less increase in vacancies leads to less increase in employment, and
hence, larger total unemployment.
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Figure 8: Immigration as Insiders
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